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Procedures and Juveniles 
T he Juvenile Causes Act! was es-tablished in Maryland to provide for a program of treatment, train-
ing, and rehabilitation consistent with the 
child's best interest and the interest of the 
public. 2 The state historically has main-
tained a parens patriae status of sovereign 
guardianship over juveniles.3 It is under 
this status that the state exercises its power 
over juveniles and provides specific con-
stitutional rights to those under its juris-
dictional control. 4 
Although a juvenile proceeding is not a 
criminal proceeding, it is not devoid of 
6-The Law ForumlFal~ 1985 
by A. David Copperthite 
criminal aspects merely because it has 
been given a civil label. 5 The fourteenth 
amendment plays an important role in 
juvenile proceedings.6 Even though these 
proceedings take on an informal color, 
rules of practice, procedure, evidence, 
and standards of fairness must be ob-
served. 7 The constitutional requirements 
regarding juveniles must be met. 8 
Taking a Child into Custody 
The Juvenile Causes Act provides vari-
ous methods for taking a child into cus-
tody.9 The court may issue a writ of at-
tachment. 10 A law enforcement officer 
may take the child into custody pursuant 
to the laws of arrest.!! If a law enforce-
ment officer or other person authorized 
by the court has reason to believe the 
child is in immediate danger and his re-
moval is necessary for his protection, the 
child may be taken into custody.!2 If the 
child is a runaway,!3 a law enforcement 
agent or court authorized party may take 
the child into custody.!4 
A police officer may make a warrantless 
arrest of any person who commits or at-
tempts a felony or misdemeanor in his 
presence or view. 15 He may arrest any 
person who he reasonably believes has 
committed the offense when he has prob-
able cause to believe a felony or misde-
meanor is being committed within his 
presence or view. 16 A police officer may 
also arrest any person he has probable 
cause to believe has committed a felony or 
misdemeanor regardless of whether the 
crime was committed in his presence or 
view. 17 This section of the Crimes and 
Punishments Article l8 also provides for 
other grounds for warrantless arrests. 19 
Basically, if a misdemeanor or felony is 
not committed within the officer's pres-
ence or view, probable cause is required 
for an arrest. 20 
The Juvenile Causes Act affords a law 
enforcement officer the power to take a 
child into custody pursuant to the laws of 
arrest. 21 In In re Appeal No. 245,22 deputy 
sheriffs investigating a bicycle theft "un-
derstood" the juvenile had been seen rid-
ing around on a bike similar to the stolen 
one. 23 The police officers testified that 
they had reason to believe the juvenile 
was involved with the theft.24 The court 
concluded that the taking of the child into 
custody was unlawful because there was 
no probable cause pursuant to the laws of 
arrest. 25 The court also noted that mere 
suspicion is not equivalent to probable 
cause and is therefore insufficient for a 
juvenile arrest. 26 
Detention and Shelter Care 
Responsibilities of Police 
Once the juvenile is taken into custody, 
the law enforcement officer must follow 
specific statutory proceedings.27 He has 
to notify the child's parents or guardians. 28 
The child may be released if the parents or 
guardians promise, in writing, to return 
the child when requested by the court. 29 
The officer may refer the case to an intake 
officer or the court if the child requires 
detention and shelter care.30 Only an in-
take officer or the juvenile court can au-
thorize detention or shelter care. 31 
Since pre-adjudicatory detention or 
shelter care is not equivalent to taking the 
child into custody, section 3-815 of the 
Juvenile Causes Act does not require a 
showing of probable cause to detain or 
shelter the child. 32 Provisions for a hear-
ing and notice of the hearing regarding 
determinations for detention or shelter 
care are present in the statute. 33 There are 
also statutory limitations on where the 
child may be placed. 34 A police officer 
can only refer the child for placement. 35 
However, the child can be placed into de-
tention or shelter care prior to any hear-
ing, and without a showing of probable 
cause if, (1) the child is likely to leave the 
jurisdiction; (2) it is necessary to protect 
the child or public interest; or (3) there is 
no person available to provide supervision 
and care for the child. 36 
Investigative Procedures 
A. Confessions One of the most 
litigated issues on appeal concerns the 
confessions of juveniles. The landmark 
case of In re Gault37 held that when ju-
veniles are in custodial interrogation, 
they must be provided with adequate 
Miranda 38 warnings. 39 Any waiver of 
these rights must be knowingly and intel-
ligently given. 40 
• • • 
•• • mere SuspIcIon IS 
not equivalant to 
probable cause 
• • • 
In In re Appeal No. 245,41 the juvenile 
was confronted at his home by police offi-
cers investigating a series of thefts.42 By 
placing the juvenile in the back seat of the 
police vehicle, the juvenile was subjected 
to custodial interrogation within the 
meaning of the Miranda decision. 43 The 
court held that the juvenile did not know-
ingly waive his privilege against self-
incrimination and right to counsel when 
inculpatory statements were given to the 
investigating officers.44 The trial court is 
required to look at the "totality of the cir-
cumstances" surrounding the waiver. 45 
The age of the juvenile alone will not 
render a waiver invalid. 46 It is also true 
that age coupled with a low intelligence 
will not render a waiver of constitutional 
rights invalidY 
In King v. State,48 the court upheld the 
rape and assault conviction of a fourteen-
year-old characterized as a slow reader 
and slow learner. 49 The elements of age 
and intelligence in waiving constitutional 
rights were considered, but under the 
totality of the circumstances, the state had 
met its burden of proving a voluntary 
waiver. 50 
In WIggins v. State,51 the court upheld a 
first-degree murder conviction of a fifteen-
year-old based on a knowing and intelli-
gent waiver of constitutionally guaranteed 
rights. 52 This waiver was challenged 
strictly on the element of age and the state 
met its burden of proving voluntariness. 53 
In this case, earlier statements which were 
not shown to be free and voluntary did 
not preclude admission of inculpatory 
statements given six days later. 54 
In King, the failure of an interrogating 
officer to allow the father of the fourteen-
year-old to see his child, did not render 
the admission by the juvenile invalid. 55 
In Miller v. State,56 the sixteen-year-old 
was given Miranda warnings and ques-
tioned for an hour and thirty-five minutes 
during which time he denied any implica-
tions that he was involved in a murderY 
He was fed and then requested to speak 
with the officers, waived his rights, and 
gave inculpatory statements. 58 His con-
viction was upheld as free and voluntary. 59 
In applying the totality of the circum-
stances test, the court in Walker v. State, 60 
rendered the confession invalid and there-
fore inadmissible. 61 The sixteen-year-old 
was detained without being given Miranda 
warnings, was not allowed to speak to his 
mother and was shown photographs de-
picting the murder scene in gory detail. 62 
The court stated that age alone will not 
invalidate a waiver but under the totality 
of the circumstances, the waiver was not 
freely and voluntarily given. 63 
In In re Appeal No. 245,64 the court also 
held that the "fruits of the poisonous tree" 
doctrine announced in Wong Sun v. United 
States,65 applied to confessions by juve-
niles. Since the officers lacked probable 
cause to take the juvenile into custody, 
statements made during the interroga-
tions were inadmissible as fruits of the 
poisonous tree. 66 
B. Judicial and Extrajudicial 
Identifications The United States Su-
preme Court in United States v. Wade67 
and Gilbert v. California,68 held that un-
der the sixth and fourteenth amendments, 
a defendant has a constitutional right to 
counsel in post-indictment pretria1lineups 
where the accused is exhibited for identi-
fying witnesses. 69 In evaluating the Wade 
requirements, the Maryland Court of 
Special Appeals erroneously applied the 
right to counsel to pre-indictment pro-
ceedings as well. 70 After Kirby v. Illinois71 
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was decided, the Court abandoned the ap-
plication of right to counsel in pre-indict-
ment proceedings. 72 
In Jackson v. State,73 this abandonment 
was predicated on the rationale that the 
accused does not face an adversarial sys-
tem of justice until he is accused (indicted) 
by the prosecution.14 The Jackson court 
makes the distinction that juvenile pro-
ceedings are not criminal proceedings.75 
At the time of the lineup in Jackson, 
the juvenile defendant had not been ar-
raigned. 76 No indictment or information 
had been filed against him.77 The court 
further stated that even if proceedings in 
juvenile court could be deemed adversar-
ial, the defendant had no sixth amend-
ment right to counsel. 78 
In In re Appeal No. 504/9 extrajudicial 
identification of the juvenile was made 
promptly on the scene by a witness. 8o A 
police officer responded to a call and saw 
a juvenile fitting the physical description 
of the suspect. 81 The juvenile was run-
ning and winded about five blocks from 
the scene. 82 He accompanied the police 
officer back to the scene where he was 
identified.83 The court held that absent 
any elements of unfairness, the identifica-
tion was legal and admissible. 84 The court 
also held that even if the taking into cus-
tody of the juvenile was unlawful, the 
identification was not "tangible" fruit of 
the poisonous tree and was still admissible 
evidence.85 
C. Search and Seizure In Payton 
v. New York,86 the United States Su-
preme Court held that the fourth amend-
ment prohibited the police from making a 
warrantless and nonconsensual entry into 
a suspect's home in order to make a rou-
tine felony arrest. 87 The Court of Special 
Appeals in In re Anthony F.,88 held that 
Payton applies equally to juveniles and to 
adults. 89 In In re Anthony P., a juvenile's 
sixteen-year-old sister consented to police 
entry into the juvenile's home to take him 
into custody without a warrant or writ of 
attachment. 9o The police officers testified 
that there was no verbal communication 
from the sister who answered the door. 91 
She simply opened it to admit them. 92 
The court held that she was competent to 
consent and the entry was valid. 93 
Tate v. State,94 concerned the issue of 
parental consent to conduct a search for 
evidence.95 In Tate, a seventeen-year-old 
was convicted of rape, kidnapping and 
unlawful use of a handgun in the commis-
sion of a violent crime.96 The defendant's 
mother had authority to consent to the 
search of her son's bedroom which yielded 
incriminating evidence.97 The court held 
that a consent to a search given by a party 
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who possesses common authority over the 
premises is valid against an absent non-
consenting person with whom that au-
thority is shared.98 
In McCray v. State,99 the defendant's fa-
ther invited the police officers in and con-
sented to the search of his son's room. IOO 
The police found stolen property in the 
area where the son slept. IOI The court 
held that a consensual search was an ex-
ception to the warrant requirement and 
the father had authority to consent to a 
search of the premises. 102 
The Education Article of the Maryland 
Annotated Codel03 provides that a prin-
cipal, assistant principal, or school secur-
ity guard may search a student on school 
premises if he has a reasonable belief that 
the student has possession of an item 
which violates the criminal law. 104 The 
statute l05 also provides for search of the 
physical plant or lockers.l06 
Public schools may also utilize drug de-
tecting dogs without offending the fourth 
amendment. l07 However, once the dog 
alerts authorities to the presence of con-
traband, a search warrant must be issued 
before the area may be searched. l08 
The scope and extent of school searches 
has been a topic of great litigation. 109 The 
controversies center over the applicability 
of the fourth amendment to juveniles, the 
exclusionary rule, and the standard re-
quired to justify a search and seizure. llo 
The Maryland statutelll ,requires "rea-
sonable belief" for a search of the person 
of a juvenile. 112 There is no standard 
codified in the statute for locker searches, 
although the Attorney General I 13 has 
stated that a search warrant is required for 
opening a locker or physical appurtenance 
when a drug-detecting dog is used. 1l4 
Maryland requires probable cause for a 
search warrant to be issued. 115 Therefore, 
probable cause is necessary for searching 
a locker when a dog is used for detection 
of contraband. I 16 
In In re Dominic W.,1l7 the court ad-
dressed the issues of the applicability to ju-
veniles of the fourth amendment, the ex-
clusionary rule, and the standard required 
for school searches. 118 The case held that 
the fourth amendment and the exclusion-
ary rule apply to school searches. 119 The 
opinion stated that the authority to search 
provided in the statute constitutes govern-
mental action sufficient to invoke the 
fourth amendment. 120 When this case was 
decided, the statute required probable 
cause to search a student. 121 The language 
was changed in subsequent amendments, 
substituting the requirement of "reason-
able belief" for probable cause. In 
In January of this year, the United States 
Supreme Court decided New Jersey v. 
T.L. 0. 123 That case concerned the search 
of the purse of a fourteen-year-old sus-
pected of smoking in a school lavatory. 124 
The Court held that the fourth amend-
ment protection applied to searches by 
school officials as well as law enforcement 
officers. 125 It also recognized that school 
children have a legitimate expectation of 
privacy. 126 A search of the child's person 
is a severe violation of the privacy right. 127 
However, since the fourth amendment 
protects against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, the Court focused on whether 
the search was justified at its inception 
and was reasonably related in scope to the 
circumstances that justified the intru-
sion. 128 The Court held that such a search 
will be permissible in scope when mea-
sures adopted are reasonably related to 
the objectives of the search. 129 
Additionally, the case pointed out that 
school officials do not need a warrant be-
fore searching a student under their au-
thority.130 The Court was very clear in 
stating that school officials do not need 
probable cause to search a student. 131 
The legality of the search depends simply 
on the reasonableness under all the cir-
cumstances. l32 In so holding, the Supreme 
Court reversed the New Jersey Supreme 
Court's decision to suppress the evidence 
of the search. 133 
It appears that the school search statute 
in Maryland134 anticipated the New Jersey 
v. T.L. 0.135 decision. Amendments to 
the statute substituted the probable cause 
requirement for a reasonable belief. 136 
The Maryland statute also distinguishes 
the search of the student and the search of 
the school. 137 Based on the holding of 
New Jersey v. T.L.O.,138 the Maryland 
statute may be interpreted to focus on the 
reasonableness of the search.139 The test 
the Supreme Court announced was to bal-
ance the needs of the school and the state 
in maintaining order and discipline in the 
school system and the privacy interests of 
the student. 140 In light of New Jersey v. 
T.L.O., the Maryland statute may be 
given a broad interpretation permitting 
greater discretion to lie with the school 
and less privacy and protection for the 
student. 141 
D. Discovery The Maryland Rules 
of Procedure allow for an open-file policy 
in discovery procedures regarding delin-
quent l42 or contributingl43 cases. 144 The 
provisions require the state to furnish the 
respondent with information or knowledge 
favorable to the respondent. 145 The state 
must release information regarding search 
and seizure, wiretaps and eavesdropping, 
statements by the respondent, and pre-
hearing identification of the respondent 
by witnesses. 146 The rule l47 also sets forth 
protected matters, procedures for discov-
ery, and a continuing duty to disclose.1 48 
In CINSI49 (Children in Need of Super-
vision) or CINA 150 (Children in Need of 
Assistance) proceedings, the court may 
order discovery upon a showing of good 
cause. 151 
E. Diversion and Station Ad-
justment Programs In addition to 
the Juvenile Services Administration, 
some jurisdictions have established diver-
sion or station adjustment programs. 152 
These programs are usually administered 
through the law enforcement agencies by 
a special group of youth trained officers. 153 
The programs are alternatives to the in-
take process of the juvenile court. 154 They 
provide limited treatment and rehabilita-
tion for juvenile offenders who have com-
mitted minor offenses. 
The Court Sanctioned Pre-Intake Ad-
justment Program in Baltimore City is an 
example of station adjustment. 155 The 
program is comprised of police officers 
trained as youth-service officers and is ad-
ministered by the Baltimore City Police 
Department. 
A juvenile can be accepted into the ad-
justment program by contact directly with 
a youth service officer or by referral from 
another law enforcement officer. In order 
to accept the juvenile, five parties must 
agree that this program is in the best in-
terest of the child. That is, the complain-
ant, the juvenile, the parents or guardians, 
the arresting officer (who may also be the 
complainant), and the youth service officer 
must approve of adjustment. If there is no 
agreement, the juvenile is referred to the 
intake process and the juvenile court 
system. 
Once the child is accepted, there are 
four basic options available to the youth 
service officer. The least restrictive op-
tion is to "warn and release." The police 
officer may take the child into custody 
and refer him to the youth service officer 
who will talk to the juvenile, warn him of 
the behavior, and release him to his home 
(the youth service officer may do this on 
the scene). 
The second alternative is limited coun-
seling. The youth service officer is trained 
to provide counse~ing services and may 
do so for up to a ninety-day period. The 




Baltimore City, only 
thirteen are repeat 
offenders. 
officer may dismiss the child at any time 
he feels the behavior has been corrected. 
The officer may also extend the time for 
an additional ninety-days by submitting a 
written request to a juvenile court judge 
setting forth the reasons for the extension. 
The third option is for the youth service 
officer to refer the juvenile to an agency. 
The Youth Services Division cooperates 
with many private and public agencies. 
The services available include medical 
care, dental care, psychological treatment, 
single parent counseling as well as family 
and individual counseling. The youth ser-
vice officer makes the initial determination 
for treatment and maintains contact with 
the child, monitoring the care provided. 
The agencies are required to submit forty-
five and ninety-day progress reports to the 
officer. 
The fourth available option is to place 
the juvenile in a work setting. Some of the 
local employers cooperate with this pro-
gram and reserve positions for referred 
children. The children receive wages and 
may have the opportunity for permanent 
employment after the ninety-day referral 
period. The officer monitors the child's 
progress throughout this alternative. 
The basic philosophy of the diversion 
and station adjustment programs is to 
focus on what can be done to help the 
child. Rehabilitation is the primary con-
cern. It is a method of "preventive main-
tenance", treating the problem juvenile at 
the initial stages before serious offenses 
are committed. One source stated that out 
of everyone-hundred juveniles in the ad-
justment program of Baltimore City, only 
thirteen are repeat offenders. 
Conclusion 
The juvenile justice system has devel-
oped because of the need to treat children 
differently than adults. 156 The difference 
extends to the procedures used by law en-
forcement agencies that come into contact 
with juveniles. The purposes of the Ju-
venile Causes Act l57 in Maryland is to 
provide for the best interests of the child 
consistent with the interest of public 
safety. 158 
The juvenile has been afforded specific 
constitutional rights and guarantees. 159 
However, those rights are not absolute 
and are balanced by the rehabilitative 
goals of the juvenile justice system. 160 
Since the courts treat juveniles differently 
than adults, they do not have all the consti-
tutional protections afforded to adults. 161 
The deprivation of those rights is often 
rationalized by the fact that the juvenile 
system is a civil rather than criminal sys-
tem. 162 The goal is to rehabilitate and not 
to punish. 163 
The broader issue is whether the juve-
nile justice system accomplishes that goal. 
Police procedures have been tailored by 
the courts in an effort to accomplish that 
goal. 164 All too often, the courts focus 
their attention on the needs of the system. 
The needs of the system are not always 
the needs of the child. 
A. David Copperthite is a third year 
student at the University of Baltimore 
School of Law and is a member of the 
Law Forum staff 
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